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Seven hazards in David Cameron’s intended European policy
This morning sees UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s long anticipated (and delayed)
speech on the UK’s relationship with the EU. Michael Emerson sets out seven major
hazards that his expected policy positions will have to overcome, ranging from defining its
core objective, problems with the referendum process, and the economic costs of
generating uncertainty over the EU/UK relationship. 
This art icle was f irst published on LSE’s EUROPP blog
Unless the Brit ish Prime Minister changes the script that he has led us to expect f or his speech later this
week on his policy intentions towards the European Union, his propositions are going to encounter a
plethora of  problems f or their successf ul implementation in the Brit ish and European interests. To set
out the litmus tests, there are no less than seven major hazards f or his policy to overcome.
The f irst hazard is the task of  def ining the core objective in a way that holds water, i.e. operational and
proportionate to the polit ical purpose of  repatriating suf f iciently substantial EU competences to claim
that he has strategically rebalanced the relationship. The UK has already opted out of  the eurozone and
the Schengen area, and does not want to opt out of  the single market and f oreign and security policy.
What is lef t to add to the opt-outs? Not much. That is why much is being made of  the possibility
(provided f or by Protocols 21 and 36 to the Lisbon Treaty) to repeal the UK’s implementation of  much
existing EU law and policy in the Freedom, Security and Justice area. The populist argument being made
that this legislation somehow threatens the rule of  law in the UK is utterly contrived.
The second hazard lies in the negot iat ing style and
tact ics current ly already being announced by the
Prime Minister, namely that of  either gett ing his way,
or if  not , blocking the eurozone’s proposals for a
new EU-based treaty to correct  its systemic
def iciencies. This is already crit icised as ‘blackmail’,
notably by some senior German parliamentarians,
but the use of  this damning language gets an
immediate echo around the rest  of  Europe. The
blackmail tact ic encounters two problems, both
fundamental. The f irst  is that  it  will not  work, since
eurozone countries are already prepared if
necessary to negot iate a new treaty outside the
formal EU legal order. The second is that  it  will harden the terms of  opposit ion to whatever the
UK wants or has as a special favour (e.g. the UK’s budget rebate).
The third hazard arises f rom the polit ical manageability of  the process, when the outcome would have to
be settled by ref erendum in the UK. The Swiss are well trained to use the ref erendum instrument f or
precisely targeted issues. For the rest of  Europe with less training, like the UK with hardly any, the hazard
is that of  the ref erendum question being transf ormed in the eyes of  voters into something other than
what the text exactly says, like general dissatisf action with the state of  the economy or general
perf ormance of  the government.
Indeed these f irst three hazards might push the polit ical dynamics into the secession scenario, or f ourth
hazard, which the Prime Minister says he does not want. But if  one looks at the secession scenario,
what does one see? The most obvious approximate model is that of  Norway, which is wholly in the single
market as member of  the European Economic Area (EEA). The problems here are that the UK would have
no say in the negotiation of  a new single market law. So the UK would have less sovereignty than it does
now over the single market, which is its highest priority domain of  EU activity. In addition, Norway has
agreed to substantial f inancial contributions to the EU structural f unds, which would certainly be
demanded of  a seceding UK.
Hazard number f ive is the potential economic cost of  the strategic uncertainty that is being created f or a
number of  years ahead, with the scenario of  secession in the air. Competit ion between EU member
states over f ootloose investment by multinational corporations is already f ierce. As Brit ish business
interests are already saying with alarm, in a situation of  strategic uncertainty f or the UK the most
obvious sales pitch of  its close neighbours will be “you cannot know where the UK will be in relation to
the EU single market in a f ew years time”. With the obstinately on-going recession in the Brit ish economy,
this is hardly a message one wishes to f acilitate.
Hazard number six concerns the polit ical f uture of  the United Kingdom itself , with pressure f or a
ref erendum in Scotland over its possible secession f rom the UK. The Scottish nationalists do not
however want to secede f rom the EU, and f or the UK to be toying with secession f rom the EU could
intensif y Scottish arguments f or seceding f rom the UK. EU lawyers seem to be of  the view that an
independent Scotland would have to apply under the regular accession procedure, and several member
states would not want to endorse this precedent. But the prospects f or a very messy tangling up of  the
debates over these Scottish, UK and EU af f airs are very real, with Cameron risking that his epitaph
becomes “the man that led the unravelling of  both the UK and EU”.
Hazard number seven concerns the place of  the UK in the world, and its relations with its closest allies
and f riends. The US has already in recent days made its posit ion absolutely clear, that its interest lies in
a strong UK voice within a strong EU. Here they are getting a crystal-clear message that the current
Brit ish government is heading in the wrong direction. The UK’s tradit ional like-thinking liberal democratic
allies in the EU, such as the Nordics and Benelux, are appalled at what they see emerging. As f or the old
Commonwealth, they went their own way a long time ago. The UK’s remaining international prestige with
major powers such as China and Russia will decline.
At least these seven hazards are now being aired in public debate, and it is f or the normal democratic
processes to sif t through the arguments and see inf ormed judgement prevail. The responsibility of  the
Brit ish Prime Minister in these next days will be at least not to f oreclose the debate by locking his
government onto a path of  uncontrollable polit ical damage, f or which the possibilit ies are nonetheless
abundantly evident.
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